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Derrida against Derrida or What does Derrida want: Jacque Derrida’s “post-deconstructive” desideratum in his interview to Jean-Luc Nancy

PAPER OF DR. DIMITIRIS SDROLIAS ANNOUNCED AT THE “DERRIDA TODAY CONFERENCE” AT CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY, CANADA, ON THE 25th OF MAY 2018

Derrida against Derrida or What does Derrida want: Jacque Derrida’s “post-deconstructive” desideratum in his interview to Jean-Luc Nancy

Abstract: Starting by observing how Jacques Derrida, in his interview to Jean-Luc Nancy (published in the volume Who comes after the subject by Cadava, Nancy and Connor), comes to offer us an overview not only of the basic drive behind his whole philosophical craving, but also a glimpse into his later concern regarding the deconstruction of his deconstruction as well, the present paper will come to highlight the way in which his desideratum towards a post-deconstructive subjectivity comes to be articulated and expressed. Subsequently, de-re-constructing this interview in terms of its logic of sequence and articulation, circling and exposing its “khôra”, we will show how this post-deconstructive desideratum concerns an “après coup quasi-heideggerian return”, and how this return might intertwine the early Heidegger, (Heidegger Ι) and the later one (Heidegger II) towards an ideally longed-for Heidegger III by Derrida until then, a Heidegger paradoxically, -and ironically regarding Derrida-, discovered literally later on, since a large part of the heideggerian oeuvre during Derrida’s lifetime remained unpublished. Keeping up, consequently, with this “impossible encounter” between Derrida and Heidegger, we will finally try to show how the post-deconstructive latent desideratum on Derrida’s behalf in its khôra-like “neither same, nor other, both same and other” double-negative-double-positive fashion, could enrich and be enriched mutually by the heideggerian concept of the “Pain of the experience” in the way it combines the notions of “Εreignis” and “Enteignis” in a novel fashion, and this in a text which remained unpublished till 2009 in German, and till 2013 in English, namely Das Ereignis, the sixth essay (out of seven) regarding his Beitraege zur Philisophie, (the seminal text behind his “Turn”). Could the “Pain of the experience” as a concept, complemented mutually in a retro-pro-spective like, non-linear untimely fashion by Derrida and Heidegger lead to the revelation of a new face of being and of the ontological difference in the 21st century? Could it highlight the continuance of the making of philosophy beyond post-modernism against the current, in regards to that, proclamation?
Keywords: post-metamodernism, post-deconstructive subject, thrownness, Zusage, Ereignis, Enteignis, “Pain of the Experience”, neither same-nor other-both-same-and other, Instinct, Wound, ontological difference

There is a certain special value inherent in the attempts of every philosopher to condense his theory orally, being interrogated (or to be put more kindly, interviewed) by an interlocutor. Of course there is a touch of violence in that –maybe even more than a touch-, and maybe of the worst kind, consisting in the violence of having to strip, remaining intellectually naked before someone else, but it is exactly therein that this special value finds its meaning and place: Because it is exactly there and then that an “unconcealment” of the most interesting kind can take place . It is there and then that a philosopher gives keys –even unintentionally- towards the decoding of his “Urdoxa”, behind its subsequent, and often complicated, surface articulations, and it is there and then, even more interestingly, under this pressure, that he/she potentially can transcend himself/herself and his/her restricting ruminations, saying more than he/she says and thinking more than he/she has ever reflected, opening to what lies ahead . And even though Jacques Derrida was always suspicious and highly critical of the value given to “oral discourse”, due to the illusions of “presence” that it entails, his is not a typical oral discourse (considering that his written discourse is not a typical one, either!). It is as if he is writing via speaking, and speaking via writing, retaining in all his written discourse the ambiguities and absences of the oral one, and in his oral one all the deconstructive and analytic properties of the written one. And all the more so here, where this blending takes place under the most “pressurized” circumstances, in terms of the condensation, and the high velocities, that are developed in an interview.
It is for all the aforementioned reasons that we will treat the Derridian text, in the form of this interview he gives to Jean-Luc Nancy, as an extensive flux of associations, but not in order to find, as a psychoanalyst would aim at, its points of presence in terms of a “petit obj.a”, that is the revelation of the way a subject attaches to its object, in the junction of their “jouissance”, but in order to dig out the way the subject tries to speak about the subject, and in particular, its “who comes after it”, since this is the initial question to which all thinkers in Cadava’s, Connor’s and Nancy’s volume had to respond. Towards the aforementioned aim we will try to unlock this interview’s text in terms of its main Event, (that is the “cog” that makes Derrida’s thought evolve itself throughout this article, giving it a firing impetus, and simultaneously reveals its ultimate desideratum, remaining per se unnamable as it coils around his “secret, non-realized garden”, which we could view as its khôra3), paving, thus, the way for the answer to the first question that the present article poses: 1) In what way does Derrida, in this interview to Nancy, deconstruct his own deconstruction? This will namely form its first section, and immediately after we deal with that, a second question will follow, entailing two parts, only to culminate in a final third one: 2a) In what exactly does Derrida’s Heideggerian critique consist? 2b) Can it be answered by Heidegger himself through his own unpublished oeuvre with which Derrida wasn’t familiar, and 3) Where, in terms of the future research on the post-deconstructive subject, and of the face of being in its post-metamodern era, does this mutual pro-retrospective complementation of minds point at?
Let’s attempt an answer to the first question head on: Derrida’s agonizing striving, throughout his whole interview, is to provide us with a “positive” substance of a “what” or a “who” on the ground of the trace, or in other words, of a “destinerrance”, a “dehiscence”, a “signature”, or a “difference”, in their ex-appropriating, “Enteignis-like” effect , something that would posit a limit to deconstruction as the “what” or “who” that remains having undergone its experience , according to his own words. He has already started working towards this direction via his elaborations on the concept of the “subjectile” , whose underlying metonymic chain throughout this interview’s text we will try to follow faithfully, if we wish to witness the exact way in which he tantalizingly strives to deconstruct his own deconstruction, realizing the leap towards the future of philosophical research on the post-deconstructive subject and the revelation of the new face of being.
Derrida starts his post-deconstructive venture with a simple “Yes, yes” , (one that he founds on Heideggerian grounds: Those of the “Zusage” ), later supplementing it by that of a “Come” , which is a response before a question, that is also before an answer. Let’s watch its metonymic sliding throughout the text: This response, in terms of an “en-gaging”, an “engagement” , and in the form of a “non-autonomy before and in view of being autonomous , forms a responsibility , and this responsibility a singularity , one that answers to the “call of the Other” and by no means can reduce itself to that of “the grammatical subject in language” , something that forces Derrida to be always cautious of the use of the term “subject” in terms of post-deconstructive subjectivity, preferring the term “subjectile” that is tantamount to a “subject effect” . At this point and in support of the feasibility, -in spite of its enormity-, of this project, he invokes Freud, complementing him through Husserl and the unexploited possibilities that his phenomenology opens us to , never failing to warn us against presence , but also against absence and finding the solution in the further metonymization of the responsive singularity of the “yes, yes” into the “Call of the Other” in an entity that would not be human , particularly that of the “animal” , that forms the common ground between the human and the non-human, and on which something like a “subject effect” could explode, characteristic of the living, (a very obscure notion indeed) and not only a privilege of “das Man” . The animal is the only guarantee against this “who”, which is out of the metaphysically restricted notion of language , and this leads to its subsequent metonymic incarnation in terms of the “throwing/being thrown” , (the infamous heideggerian “Geworfenheit” ), regarding which Derrida accuses Heidegger of having marginalized it in his oeuvre , together with the question of the “animal” that it entails, treating the latter somewhat awkwardly . Trying to link “Geworfenheit” with the Call, by saying that “Geworfenheit” can signify “a manner of being delivered, exposed to the ‘Call (Ruf)” , Derrida is trying to ponder on whether this call is an indeterminate one, or one that is concrete and particular in its ever-recurring “here and now” urgency, trying, thus, to attribute it to a calculability through the uncalculable and the undecidable , that is an excess , which opens it to the ethics of “another democracy , so as for “the worst” , (fascism), to be avoided. A fold takes place at this point. The “who” is suddenly seen as an active respondent, not a passive one (as was the case till now), from the perspective of the “throwing”, not only the “being thrown” , the emphasis being now on that “come” , besides the “yes, yes”, making space for the introduction of the “who’s” “sacrificial structure” , in all its monstrosity , its carnivorous vitality in terms of ingestion, introjection, incorporation , and its carno-phallogocentrism , (revealing its “hostage-like” structure to work in a two way fashion, beyond its levinasian context, as en-gaging in holding a hostage, together with being held as one), opening up to responsive “en-gagements» like the “interiorization of the phallus and the necessity of its passage through the mouth, whether it is a matter of words or things, of sentences , of daily bread or wine, of the tongue, the lips, or the breast of the other’” . Of course, in terms of all that, the “metonymy of ‘bien manger’ would always be the rule” , and that is Derrida’s concern towards the formulation of the post-deconstructive subject, consisting in finding the point on which to “cut” it , this right limit so as for the “Other” to remain non re-appropriable in its inevitable eating and being eaten. The “who’s” metonymic incarnation has reached now the point of a good eater in his being eaten, since “one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes good to eat” , thus evoking “a law of need or desire, orexis, hunger or thirst” to be found in the “respect for the other at the very moment when, in experience (…) one must begin to identify with the other, who is to be assimilated, interiorized” . Of course this limit, this law, which will stem organically après coup from a future determination of this post-deconstructive “who”, cannot be granted inside the metaphysical restrictions of language, which is responsible for all current “differences, ruptures and wars” , but does not reside in silence either, since how can one remain silent before an “Auschwitz” in all its metonymy ? Derrida thus concludes by implying that one shouldn’t nevertheless rush towards the impression that this task is infeasible, due to one’s entrapment in the metaphysical restrictions of language, since it is not at all certain whether human language is restricted to only being “human” . After all, it is impregnated, like that of the animal’s, with the same stigmas of the “mark”, the “trace”, of “iterability”, of “differance”. So let us all grant to “in-humanity”, the dignity of the Animal. This, according to Derrida, is our post-deconstructive task

But how to follow Derrida towards that task? Where in this dense interview of his to Nancy, under the title: “Eating well or the calculation of the subject” are we to find the keys towards the securing of a limit that would serve as a guarantee for the non-reappropriable of the other in the same per se, which could feature ideally as the “who” that comes after the Subject? The first and the most auspicious place to search would be of course the exact points in his interview’s text, where he unravels his critique against Heidegger. Let us, then, throw a lens on those passages, bringing them together in a quasi-collage, and proceed to the second question our article poses, namely: In what exactly does Derrida’s Heideggerian critique consist?

“The ‘logic’ of the trace or of differance determines this re appropriation as an ex-appropriation. Re-appropriation necessarily produces the opposite of what it apparently aims for. Ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man (…) What would link the analytic of Dasein with the heritage of the subject would perhaps be more the determination of Dasein as Geworfenheit, its primordial being thrown, rather than the determination of a subject that would come to be thrown, but a being-thrown that would be more primordial than subjectivity and therefore [more primordial] than objectivity as well. A passivity that would be more primordial than traditional passivity and than Gegenstand (Gegenwurf, the old German word for object, keeps this reference to throwing, without stabilizing it into the stance of a “stehen”) (…) I am trying to think through this experience of the throwing/being-thrown of the subjectile beyond the Heideggerian protocols about which I was just speaking and to link it to another thinking of destination, of chance and of destinerrance (…) Starting at ‘birth’ and possibly even prior to it, being-thrown reappropriates itself or rather ex-appropriates itself in forms that are not yet those of the subject or the project. The question «who» then becomes: Who (is) thrown? Who becomes ‘who” from out of the destinerrance of the being-thrown? That it is still a matter here of the trace, but also of iterability (…) means that this ex- appropriation cannot be absolutely stabilized in the form of the subject. The subject assumes presence, that is to say sub-stance, stasis, stance. Not to be able to stabilize itself absolutely would mean to be able only to be stabilizing itself. Ex-appropriation no longer closes itself; it never totalizes itself. One should not take these figures for metaphors (metaphoricity implies ex-appropriation), nor determine them according to the grammatical opposition of active/passive. Between the thrown and the falling (Verfallen) there is also a possible point of passage. Why is Geworfenheit, while never put into question, subsequently given to marginalization in Heidegger’s thinking? This is what, it seems to me, we must continue to ask. And ex-appropriation does not form a boundary, if one understands by this word a closure or a negativity. It implies the irreducibility of the relation to the other. The other resists all subjectivation, even to the point of the interiorization-idealization of what one calls the work of mourning (…) The «logic» of the trace or of differance determines this re- appropriation as an ex-appropriation. Re-appropriation necessarily produces the opposite of what it apparently aims for. Ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man . The experience or the opening of the as such in the onto phenomenological sense does not merely consist in that which is lacking in the stone or the animal; it equally involves that to which one cannot and should not submit the other in general, in other words the ‘who’ of the other that could only appear absolutely as such by disappearing as other ” (…)”.
What does Derrida want to complement the Heideggerian thought with, through his own radicalization of “Geworfenheit”, in order for him to reach his so difficult-to-articulate, most longed-for, post-metamodern desideratum? Since he speaks of appropriation and ex-appropriation in regard to “Geworfenheit”, what he is truly aiming at, is to show that 1) the Heideggerian Ereignis in its appropriation is not “Same enough”, in its relation to a “who”-constant, or, in other words, “present” enough, while 2) at the same time the Heideggerian Enteignis in its ex-appropriation is not sufficiently “absent” or “Other”. Here are the excerpts from the above cited collage that more particularly serve as a proof to those two points equivalently:
1) (…) A passivity that would be more primordial than traditional passivity and than Gegenstand (Gegenwuif, the old German word for object, keeps this reference to throwing (…) .
2) (…) The other resists all subjectivation, even to the point of the interiorization-idealization of what one calls the work of mourning (…) The «logic» of the trace or of differance determines this reappropriation as an ex-appropriation. Re-appropriation necessarily produces the opposite of what it apparently aims for (…) that to which one cannot and should not submit the other in general, in other words the «who» of the other that could only appear absolutely as such by disappearing as other (…)

Derrida at this point cannot provide us with an a concept that would condense the above mentioned polarities, that’s for sure, given the way his interview ends. But could maybe Heidegger, in the most unexpected and paradoxical of ways, provide us with one? He, the recipient of Derrida’s polemic himself? Isn’t he at least entitled to defend himself in this unjust trial, held against him after his death? Where else, but in his unpublished oeuvre, the one with which Derrida couldn’t have possibly been familiar, since it got published after his death, should one search for a possible defense, since Jacques Derrida was “notorious” for his scrupulous study of every thinker with whom he engaged himself? Heidegger’s answer is to be found indeed unexpectedly in an unpublished, until 2009 in German, and until 2013 in English, essay of his, namely Das Ereignis, his sixth (out of seven) essay regarding his Contributions. Let us at this point take a step back and give him the stand, allowing him to insert a patch, more of a strut, on Derrida’s thought, something that Derrida himself was so fond of doing, (always open to “parasites” and their “mélange”). And let’s see if this untimely addendum can not only promote the Derridian venture in a pro-retro-spective manner, but also, in the same exact way, help Heidegger compensate, at least up to a certain extent, for his own “failures” and traps. There follows a dense collage from his Das Ereignis, where he speaks of a concept that could feature, according to our view, as this “both-same-and-other, neither-same-nor other” “chorian” ground that Derrida seeks for desperately as a way to give his “Enteignis” a phenomenologically positive sign.

“Pain is the inceptual sharpness of fulfilled knowledge. Pain is the forbearance, which, in withstanding, has originally gathered together the horror of what threatens and the bliss of what entices. In this withstanding in the time-space of the turning (the truth of beyng as the beyng of truth –essentially occurring as the nearest ring of the twisting free of the inceptuality) pain is stedfastness in the experience of appropriation. Only in the pain of the enduring is beyng illuminated for the human being of the history of beyng. Only the preservation (preserving custody of that event) preserves inceptual ‘pure presence’, in case this should ever be spoken of. Pain is the inceptual (replying to the beginning and thus corresponding to it) transformation of unique knowledge. The horror of the abyss in the beginning and the bliss of the departure into the appropriation, are inceptual and are not of such a kind that ‘feelings’ could ever reach them. In the withstanding-steadfast essence of pain, there rests the experience of the event, an experience which constantly brings the difference to knowledge in its history. This experience is the essence of the thinking of the history of beyng. That thinking, in turn, grounds the experience in which the human essence in the history of beyng preserves the foreignness constituting the inhabited place of the abyss for the human being (…) We surmise nothing of the ground of pain in death, a pain that is not ‘’one” pain among others, but is the essentially occurring abyss of path, taking pain as the essence of the experience of being (…) “to see” – to have an eye for “being” –destiny- the truth of beings. This seeing is the sight of the pain of experience. That capacity to suffer, up to the affliction of the complete concealment of going away (…) Experience is the pain of the departure, a pain that belongs to the twisting free of beings. This pain, insofar as we twist free of it, first unfolds the bliss together with the horror (…)
“.
What does this Heideggerian collage manifest, in the most intense of ways, if not an attempt on Heidegger’s behalf to throw a bridge between his early and late phase, trying to suture his “Failure” , giving an “affirmation” to his Enteignis (the Other), but not making of it another kind of transcendental subject as he has previously done with his “Dasein” (condemning it to the Same)? Isn’t that, in fact, what Derrida also strives for, as is proven indisputably throughout the entirety of his interview, the finding of a guarantee towards the non-reappropriable of the Other in the Same per se? The only thing now left to be seen is if this could be found in the concept of “Pain” also in the case of Derrida.
In order to test that, let’s for a moment dive back again into his metonymic chain, as we presented it earlier. If one takes a final step back, in an attempt to catch a glimpse of the whole Derridian picture in his interview to Nancy, one can eventually conclude that this whole chain of metonymies, in Derrida’s attempt to articulate his ultimate post-deconstructive desideratum and to give a positive final limit to his project of deconstruction, trying to demolish and transcend himself towards the future, coils around a sole word, namely the verb to “respond”. In the first half of his interview he views it in its passive connotation, as the “responsivity” of the “being thrown”, in its passive hospitality of its “being eaten”, its being let to be eaten, whereas in the second half of his interview he views it in its active connotation, as the “responsibility” of the “throwing”, that is in its “eating” active-toxic engagement. What could hence serve as the binding thread between these two experiences, that of the eating, and that of the being eaten in all their “responding” nature, which phenomenon would condense in a phenomenological nature the structural moments of “eating” and “being eaten”, in their toxic-sacrificial connotations, if not the experience of “Pain” in all its “Pain of the experience”? What could best come to catch the essence of this parasite-host relation, that is here being drawn irreducibly by Derrida, in terms of this relation of the “ego” to an “Other”, to which one is always held hostage, and which one always holds as his hostage, if not the concept of “Pain”, in all its “Cry” on the brink of language, exactly at the point where something like an “Ego” responds to something like a “World”? What could best vindicate the etymological meaning of the verb “to re-spond”, which stems from the Greek word “σπονδή/spondee”, meaning “pledge”, “Zusage”, in this devilish happy meeting of meaning between three languages, the German, the English, and the Greek, saying “yes” to the inevitable “yes” of Pain, if not the biggest proof of a pledge that the living can leave on being and can receive from being, namely “Pain”? Isn’t this the biggest proof that it is alive? And that it is somewhat already dead? That it is a being? Isn’t this the point, therefore, where something like a subject, could emerge? Isn’t “Pain” exactly that place Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida are so desperately searching for, common to all living beings, beyond the distinction “human-non human”, where this appropriation of an ex-appropriation and this ex-appropriating of appropriation could take place, vindicating Derrida’s enormous cautions against “pure presence” and against ‘pure absence”, against the falsifying of the Other, but also its appearing as alter –ego only on the ground of the Same, there where the Other can reach its climax only “disappearing as other” ? Furthermore what else, if not “Pain”, in its form also as “com-passion”, as the common ground of Pain between living beings, could serve as a “law of need and desire, of orexis, thirst, hunger”, leading to an ethics of a “good eater”? What could best serve, in terms of a most most-longed-for post-deconstructive agency by the state-of-the-art research in contemporary continental philosophy regarding the “control of a letting” and the “letting of a control” that a post-metamodern notion of an “agency” would entail, other than this “yes, yes”, that is the coming to terms, (in all its “Come”, the acceptance, in all its calculation) with the Pain that the subject inflicts on the object, and with which it is inflicted by the Object, in all their asymmetry, their non-complementarity, their non-satiability? Isn’t there that a subject of a discrepant “retard originaire”, an “originary delay” could emerge, the subject of a deference, of a difference, that is of a différance?
The totality of Derrida’s metonymic chain, enlightened additionally by its underlying “impetus” as residing in the the Heideggerian “Pain of the experience”, brings the latter to the fore of philosophical research in such an urgent manner, that we are left astounded as to why the concept of “Pain” has remained until now uninvestigated in the philosophical realms. Isn’t “Pain” the best link to our dignified “animality”, in all its glory, which, in all its non-humanity could safeguard us from the traps of “das Man”? And where does this pain of the animal, inherent in a non-human fashion in all of us, lead in terms of future research, if not towards an onto-phenomenology of the Instinct , in all its uninvestigated dignity regarding its ontology, one that would not hastily escape from its “Pain” via a psychoanalytic discourse, restricted to viewing it only in terms and through the lenses of the “sexual structure” and most recently “jouissance”, but that would remain immanent on the “souffrance”, the “sufferance”, the Pain prior to “jouissance” itself? It is only through the most serious development of an existential analytic based on the hidden existential ontology of the instinct and its Pain in all its “Death” –which would de-re-construct the Heiddggerian one preparing Being and Time for the 21st century , totally reformulating the Heideggerian categories of “thrownness” “co-being/falling” and “projection”- that a new conceptualization of the “ontological difference” in the history of being could take place. And that is because the “Parasite-Host” complex, in its mutually interchanging-interchangeable Pain, (in all its “eating and being eaten”) reveals the relation between beings and being to be one in which the Host and its Parasite are being bled and bleed each other constantly in their indefatigable Pain. They neither just co-exist, as was thought of till now in the realms of the Heideggerian paradigm, being “adopted” by being, nor escape from each other in an eternally returning, -that is also eternally escaping- “mutating” (in terms of Deleuze), “residual” (in terms of Lacan) or “deconstructive” (in terms of Derrida) fashion, as in the realms of the meta-modern one. They irreversibly castrate each other, pointing, thus, towards the existential analytic of an ontologically archi-castrated (before being sexually castrated) Dasein . It is, thus, exclusively on the locus of the “Instinct” and its hitherto unheard of existential analytic, that the future philosophical game must be played, if philosophy is to take itself seriously, remaining faithful to its primary duty, namely the observation of the most elementary of phenomena, since the Instinct in all its “Pain of the experience” is the most elementary one of all. It is high time philosophy repealed its embargo on the Instinct, as a non-able-to-produce-thought phenomenon, thus moving past the partial knowledge it has until now summoned regarding the human condition. This would be our only hope towards an authentic opening to an ontology of Love, the most mysterious human phenomenon, which we haven’t, not even by chance, even started to imagine.

Life and Deaths of the Freudian Unconscious. Presentation of Dimitris Sdrolias at the 23d World Congress of Philosophy.

Birth and deaths of the Freudian unconscious:
Towards a new-born Cogito

Abstract: After initially attempting to establish a connection between philosophy’s main problematic and the psychoanalytic theorization of the unconscious, making a first step towards its view under the Heideggerian “Destruktion”, -the historical account of being in terms of its own epochs-, we attempt to show that although indeed the unconscious came to support initially the Kantian finite limit, giving a new-born background to new philosophical theories, enriching and expanding crucially what we consider knowledge, leading after all philosophy to face its ownmost challenge, as death’s most primordial study, embracing therefore substantially our human per se condition with new, unprecedented data, in terms of its finite mystery, it failed this goal fundamentally. Its ownmost way of dying, though, -positively or even negatively-, in the course of its brief history, highlighted wholly different paths that need to be now taken, untraced by psychoanalysis or even by philosophy, pushing us to an uncharted ground, which doesn’t give newborn contents –in this way of course negating it- to the notion per se of Limit. Because it is by now apparent, that this is our only hope out of our current no way out, that of the meta-modern paradigm, which led us to the big holocaust of an anarchic difference behind neo-capitalistic crises. But how is it really possible to think from our thought’s limit, defining anew the conscious? Because it is true indeed that someone or something thinks behind our almighty cogito, thinking there on a Hole. But what would this Hole now here signify? A “Vacuum” –to say the least- “cogitans”? Is it just only an “Other”? A quasi or pure Alterity? Unconscious or mere pre-conscious? How can our thought per se think through its own unthinkable? It may be that on the contrary to Hamlet’s most famous monologue, there after all exists an instrument for the unknown. A death’s so called intuition. Herein should now enter the era of our new philosophy. To a cogito per se of Death. To an “entropic” Conscious. On which Ego’s new experience, would this be eventually based?

Keywords: consciousness, unconscious, post-structuralism, meta-modernism, post-metamodern paradigm, difference, dream, limit, real, deconstruction, death intuition, cogito of death, wound, pain.

I would like now, that I’m still at the beginning of this article, before sliding into its peripheral tracks, to discern its general aim from afar, viewing it in its widest scope , against its broad horizon. This is the same horizon, on which the simplest, therefore the most complex of questions rise, whose red threads I wish to follow and which will traverse my text’s body like arteries.
I immediately dare therefore ask what could without doubt stand as the question of today’s philosophy: At which exact point of the philosophical venture did the psychoanalytic theorization become pertinent? Because it is surely true, that if we wish to reflect on our being’s current epoch , that is on its contemporary paradigm, beyond the former one, that of metamodernism , bringing in this way philosophy before its highest challenge, where it should respond at once, -against the pseudo-prophecies concerning its final death – we ought to account for this fatal, yet unexpectedly odd, encounter, between philosophy and psychoanalysis, which has not yet taken place, at least satisfactorily enough . And we say odd, because their first repulsion , -even the later one – is widely known to all. And we say fatal, because the extent, to which our thought and its conditions changed, even mutated -one might dare say-, due to their crossing , is also well known already. And yet in fact so intensely, that one could indeed support, that the philosopher ought to be a psychoanalyst, and the psychoanalyst a philosopher, given that this assemblage would indeed give now its owner -a hybrid still thrust with doubt-, a broader and more privileged view over the following Era. If we don’t simply grasp them, in their most complex structure, the terms of their mutual junction, we have no right to hope for an exit out of our current no way out, to which our Age pertains: Τhe holocaust of difference .
And when we speak of junction, we ought to note the following: Τhat this has taken place not on a point of fusion but on a point of scission, so that the common question: “How do philosophy and psychoanalysis in fact relate”, may thus be also interpreted, as if it really asked how indeed not at all. Because no intersection actually is free of some mutual blood: And as Laius the King himself, a dangerous alter ego in relation to his son Oedipus, -his double, most lethal shadow -, struggled with him to death in those ancient intersected streets , this is how philosophy and psychoanalysis first came to meet on cost of their intersection.
And of course it was surely death the Gift from the one to the other, that psychoanalysis gave philosophy, which the unconscious sent to the conscious. Death in the name of Limit. Psychoanalysis without doubt limited the omnipotence of philosophy. Leaving our holes exposed. It made our knowledge stumble, accounting for our transparent bodies. But now what kind of limit would this exactly be? Since it is surely true, philosophy, right from its rise and dawn, was known as death’s own study . But has it really studied death? Not even close till now. Because if one bears in mind how it managed to escape from it , even in the case of philosophers, who, ironically, were death’s main thinkers , one would expect the following to come out from this discussion: How through its subsequent deaths, the deaths of the unconscious, -which really did in fact initiate, and if not, surely invigorated- the finite’s newborn discourse, eventually, though, escaping it, we ought to give new meaning nowadays again to consciousness and its undiscovered registers.
But let us directly start right from the beginning: Τhe first one to raise a limit against the almighty conscious was Immanuel Kant himself . It was indeed first Kant, with his famous “Thing in itself” , who “ruined” our old philosophy , the philosophy of the non-finite, -of course still in such a way, as surely to quickly make up for it -, and it was with him that Heidegger wanted to mainly identify, -after his well known “Failure” – rather than Edmund Husserl . It is this Kantian hole per se, this Kantian hole in knowledge, which came to be the hidden base for Freud and his unconscious. Therein appears its birth. The unconscious first came to live on the edge of this sharpest limit. And although since then traditionally this limit was seen as “wall” , the Freudian unconscious saw it alternatively as a “boundary”, as far as it came to add its own and private ground beyond that Kantian limit, a ground now all made of dream. There where our knowledge stumbles, from now on starts our dream. The stardust of our dream’s memory inhabits now our unconscious, filling it through and through with what our knowledge banished. Parallel to Martin Heidegger’s new inner-worldly memory , expanded throughout the interplay of open sets, fields and networks , memory of our awake there Dasein, memory of the future , (a “dream world” of our awake per se, according to phenomenology, where entities become phenomena), lies another memory, the memory of our dream itself , memory of our past’s presence, -of our sleep while awake -, memory of our oblivion, as Nietzsche per se prepared it . In this sense we open gradually apart from the same to the other, which additionally came to enforce philosophy’s main concern . Philosophy’s key concern was always the quest for freedom: The finding of an equilibrium point, a point of ideal balance, so that the human entity can feel on the one hand one in the all, and one with the all on the other, so that it can belong, not having to belong at all, same with itself and other all at the same time. Philosophy’s main task, therefore, has consisted in inventing algorithms, perfecting dialectical syntheses as a therapy towards freedom. Alongside these struggles, though, it came to wholly sacrifice pieces that form the real, -larval entropic bodies of change and of becoming-, which since then were always pressing for immediate reintegration. And although via Soren Kierkegaard or via indeed Friedrich Nietzsche philosophy tried to offer us its ownmost keen solutions, proposing a will to power’ s eternal return in the infinite via indeed forgetting , or addressing this same will’s impetus alternatively to a wholly other, God’s here-and-now-moment , avoiding altogether the “Aufhebung” of Hegel’s doctrine, -but not avoiding infinity-, nevertheless psychoanalysis responded totally differently to this highly urgent problem, by turning our eyes on that field, which boiled with real’s crude entropy: Namely, on the field of dream, as was revealed anew by the discourse of the hysteric, and his/her discontinuous Body, the discourse of the “slave” per se , who was never till then considered as a candidate vital key holder of a sacrificed body of truth. In this sense now exactly, registered as a heroic quest for truth’s maltreated Body, psychoanalysis rewrites alternatively the connotation of the word «alethia» , subverting it from the return of memory, (mnemi), of what I must remember, to the return of my οblivion (lethi), of what I in fact forgot, having indeed repressed it, negated it, or foreclosed it .
A first step had thus been made. From now on our real of reals, was mediated by our dreamiest dreams. And if we indeed consider that up to that point the senses, in combination or against the mind, or the mind against the senses, were reality’s sole mediators, recorders, or even generators according to the view of philosophy, who else could this now be, according to the psychoanalytic view, but that strange, peculiar force, baptized by Freud as libido, a traction and repulsion-like energy, a union and separation impetus, traversing our body’s holes via its material fluxes, moving among their openings, defining them anew as limits? It seems as though here for once, a fluid or a leaking body, is featuring as an alternative recorder of our reality in place of our mind or senses. So as to freely say, that there where our knowledge ends, from now on starts our “Eros”. And there where till now we‘re limited by the “Thing in itself” per se, from now on we are only limited by the object of our Desire.
Therein, however, lay the unconscious’ first sudden death. We diagnose at least two ways in which it did go astray: 1) Due to the re-integration of the unconscious into the conscious, 2) due to the exactly opposite. In the first of the previous cases, we didn’t avoid enforcing our traditional Ego anew, this time enriched additionally with elements per se of dream. The Freudian declaration here, concerning his ideal goal, confirms this most absolutely: “There where the unconscious was, now should come the Ego (Wo Es war, soll Ich werden) ”. The Subject and Object here remain almost traditional, enriched through the integration of unconscious representations. So although the unconscious seemed to have its own body initially, the latter was a transitional, a temporary indeed body, destined to be encompassed in the body of our Ego’s Subject , featuring as the conscious. No wonder that Freudian theory, especially after Freud’s death, gave subsequent rise to the psychologies of the Ego . And even though Jacques Lacan tried to restore from scratch Freud’s lost pride and honour , one holds Freudian theory as culpable of such a progress. This is how in fact the unconscious died its initial, primary death. But as we already mentioned, the opposite took also place. The injection this time of consciousness into a deified unconscious, which led to the rise of surrealism. Surrealism needed the unconscious to found its new reality. The movement which so much glorified the
“perchance per se to dream” , which led to its vital automatisms abolishing the reign of reason, and which although it enriched undoubtedly our thought again from start, -and primarily of course our art-, it quickly fell in the traps of certain unavoidable stereotypes, leading to its “sclerosis”, showing a final no way out to this promising turn of the road . Would surrealism exist at all without per se the unconscious? Such was their close communion, that the surrealist “faux pas” per se was credited to Freud himself. Given this twist and turn, no wonder that Freud condemned it –and by it we mean the unconscious- finally with a limit, there where he introduced us to the “bedrock” of our castration , which once and for all restricted the omnipotence of its authority. No Ego could now surpass the finiteness of the sexes. But here his opus ends. Leaving us all in wοnder as to where it would lead. (There also lies our challenge: Τo take now things from that point, wherefrom they abruptly ended).
So we can ask the question: Could we adopt a thought that somehow would in fact preserve the properties of the Freudian field, (displacement, condensation) in their conceptualizations of entropic change and becoming, as recordings of the real per se with a minimum loss of data, signalling irreducibly traditional Reason’s Limit, avoiding the confinement, thus, anew within an Ego, preserving the contradiction, though, of the same seen as an other? Which revolutionary paradigm would take over such a task?
No other of course than structuralism. The theory of inter-connectionism among big and complex networks, (without, though, integrating them in “clearings” or “an Abyss”) assimilates the Hegelian negative’s ever- generating impetus, the Husserlian emancipation of parts against the whole, and the Heideggerian Differenz per se as key deviation forces, in order to preserve the dream’s condensing and displacing power, without however falling in the trap of (bio)subjectivism, -integrating, synthesizing, or last but not least reducing-, leading us to a new born field, as an ideal candidate for the production of a thought more faithful to our abused real: A thought based on the field of language. Language replaces dream as a reality closer to reality. (Isn’t that really after all the challenge in Lacan’s “return”? To prove that per se the unconscious is structured like a language , showing that the field of Freudian dream had exactly the same properties as the linguistic field of Saussure?). Albeit with one addendum: The unconscious should now be taken as a variation of per se the conscious , encompassing in its broader scope elements found in dream, a movement without doubt founded on the Saussurian act itself, enriched by the Freudian The interpretation per se of Dreams . Language was now thus viewed in its multilayer level, exploding from its inside into its endo-structures, which aren‘t from now on limited to our strict “what” of meaning, but are interspersed integrally throughout its “how’s” wild dance .
But now our unconscious’ death strikes here ex contrario. Via its inverse diffusion, -in comparison, that is to surrealism-, into a “surplus-realism”. There where the unconscious was only at a previous instant, now it’s already conscious, so as to melt subsequently into the first anew. As if it’s always blinking here , through sudden bolts of lightning. Its Freudian spatiotemporal localized articulation is now forever gone through its complete dispersing into the guts of language. Our language possesses now all the unconscious necessary for the latter to renounce its ownership over a restricted space, getting here social totally, exiting its private nutshell. But something gets lost again. Because the linguistic network at some time attains its closure. There, where a sentence ends. A paragraph, a text, a book. And away goes our most ardent hope of a thought based on our unconscious. Since it gets lost anew among an infinite finite , which cuts up and divides the unconscious in infinitely little pieces, depriving it from the quintessence of its most finite limit. There where the sentence ends, in favour of a certain meaning, the effect of the limit’s finiteness goes astray completely. The object, albeit in pieces, gets “synthesized” again. The subject’s here dead concurrently, but presences “après coup” , on the ashes of its finitely infinite irreducible mutilation. That’s how our poor unconscious dies its ex contrario death. Via its “structuralization”.
Here enter the post-structuralists in hope of a new solution. Playing with meaning’s boundaries in the new field of language. Trying to re-conceptualize the subject-object complex, defining anew its “Sym-ptom” , seeing it now as difference, -insoluble, not synthesizable- in all its iridescent meanings. Fighting to the end heroically with the thought of representation , or alternatively undermining it . Struggling to keep wide open our structural network’s circuit, not closed on its ownmost terms ironically by its very weapons. Let’s now see each one of them in their own special systems.
One of the ways to cure the closure of the linguistic network, would be the identification with that exact point within it, which causes it in the first place, while nevertheless remaining its innermost outside. This is the so called “extimate”, Lacan’s famous “object a” , a most irreducible difference between subject and object, the point of their “jouissance”, pleasure but also suffering, -since it on the one hand promises an access to a certain object, whereas on the other hand it bans it most absolutely-, compressing in it our truest lie, being there simultaneously a lack as our most basic truth, and also an archi-fraud in essence, an illusory archi-phantasm. It is in this way exactly that Jacques Lacan highlights it in his most renowned article, that on the “purloined letter” . And surely, in order to achieve that, the signifier is now separated completely from its own signified , entering without return into a signifier chain in language. But it fails to remain faithful to its primary mission, namely to expose completely our most finite limit. Because now here our ex-timate, -and that is our obj.a-, functions in fact as “masque” : Although it still reminds us, that it is only a lie, -putting this way a limit to our most true of truths-, it nevertheless “shows us something” being a signifier, resulting in a certain “Ding”, the jouissance of the letter’s “matter”, in that way completely faking its function as pure, sheer limit, since it recurs eternally as our eternal symptom, not to say our “sinthome” . Although in Jacques Lacan, that is, there is no truth as whole , the unconscious in Lacanian theory, in its Meurlopontian chiasm, as an invisible visible , as an impossible possible, is remaining so self-evident , shining in its transparency, that it totally ex contrario annihilates per se the unconscious. And in spite of the fact that this time the network remains open, (not closing there exactly where meaning has closed already), keeping alive the surprise of a most sudden limit, it nevertheless rises promises to help us locate a truth, going through psychoanalysis, identifying with the lack per se, – cause of desire of the other-, which still keeps the circuit running, escaping again from Death as our most finite limit. So, although he tries incessantly to not close the network’s circuit, on the contrary thus expanding it, liberating the signifier, he inhabits anew its boundary with a “semblent” of content, -that of his famous obj.a-, which as a pure archi-phantasm gives the incorrect impression of being a finite limit.
Therefore the key concern of Deleuze’s parallel venture was exactly in fact the following: To avoid immobilizing the structural networks’ circuit on only one point of privilege, -the point of obj.a-, but to open to a depersonalization and alienation without limits . Object and subject here always remain in progress, exploding under mutation. As the grand representative of the promising thought of difference , he exposes it here completely out of the field of language, -cutting, however, through it-, viewing it as a consequence of a complex body of senses . He therefore indeed now manages to trespass the signifier, as in its materiality it maintained a “representation” viewing it as a “portmanteau” . The sense here never closes, remaining under construction , defining itself continually, with every new-added difference accumulating on the former one without any kind of synthesis in the traditional sense or meaning. Even the repetition here is in itself a difference. Language indeed refers itself to the chaos of sheer, pure senses, functioning like a camera, a mega-machine in motion, which insatiably edits data derived from our external pores, our “bodies without organs”, without worrying at all how to synthesize them, since from now on the syntheses occur on their own completely, randomly and surprisingly, via their differential nature, on planes of territorialization, so that they afresh subsequently can deterritorialize again . The senses produce here constantly newer and newer senses, taking thus part now totally in a non-stop creation, having as sole invariable their an-archic difference. This is, then, now our new-born thought that wholly rewrites the real, no longer still polarizing it in conscious and unconscious areas, but fuses these poles completely, folding the real multiply and intricately around itself, in a radical plane of immanence, creating per se the virtual as it produces the actual, in an ever-dilating Real. What can we say then after all about Deleuze’s unconscious ? The unconscious here dying multiply turns out to not die at all , since through a schizo-(un)-conscious thought it gets always born anew .
It is this scheme exactly that Jacques Derrida puts forward: To exceed the Deleuzian paradox, aiming at further excavating structural fields and networks locating their aporias , without, though, on the contrary, hyper-invigorating them, negating them thus anew. The bet so now in Derridian terms, is not to rebuild once more on other virtual realities, -which either refer to dream (Freud), to chains of signifiers (Lacan), or trans-empiric data (Deleuze)-, but deconstruct this reality , in its own play of the signified, which incessantly in its writing seems to be already written. He digs among its adhesions, finding right there its basic chasm, the rift and the crack in meaning, causing a proto-delay, in its archi-discontinuity . The object here isn’t changing, differing in its non-stop construction, but on the contrary is dissolving, in its perpetual de-construction. In Jacques Derrida’s new paradigm we manage to get primordially to the deference itself of difference, its cause and presupposition-the famous differance itself-, to that point, that is, in the latter which causes in fact the former, there where the field primarily folds before its production , in its primary scission between the inside and the outside , before sameness and otherness, similarity and dissimilarity, difference and repetition. And this is by no means viewed still as a Moebius tape , continuous in its discontinuity, transparent in its non-transparency, as is by Jacques Lacan, but more so as a spatial “Chora”, a sliding “blank Space” indeed, which gives birth itself to difference, producing thus also its Time. It is this archi-difference that’s here in eternal delay, relentlessly deconstructing whatever stands in its own way. But this is also the reason why it gets self-negated, since it recurs eternally -even if what repeats itself is now a “moving hole”-. And although now here the finite’s thought is indeed much more refined, since it avoids requiring Lacan’s and Deleuze’s contents, -obj.a or the simulacra-, it doesn’t avoid its suicide through its non-stop recurrence. So could we after all, eventually, conceive of a new thought’s form, in its granting this “delay” a “telos” , vindicating anew the Limit, without returning blindly to a traditional metaphysics, bringing phenomenology up to its utmost limits? Putting an end irreducibly to the eternal return of Difference in all its above variations, (obj.a, difference, differance), leading to our New Holocaust? The Holocaust of the Multiple? The Holocaust per se of Difference? Behind neo-capitalistic crises?
In order to wholly summarize what has till now preceded, one could here say the following: Although indeed the Unconscious came to support initially the Kantian finite limit, giving a new-born background to new philosophical theories, enriching and expanding crucially what we consider knowledge, supporting in this way philosophy to live up to its ownmost challenge, as death’s primordial study, embracing therefore substantially our human per se condition, with new, unprecedented data, in terms of its finite mystery, it failed this goal fundamentally. Its ownmost way of dying, though, -positively or even negatively -, in the course of its brief history, highlighted wholly different paths that need to be now taken, untraced by the “old philosophy” or even by psychoanalysis, pushing us to an uncharted ground, which doesn’t give newborn contents –in this way of course negating it- to the notion per se of Limit, through its return eternally, thematic or non-thematic, via a sur-reality, or via an expanded ego. But how is it really possible to think from our thought’s limit, defining anew the unconscious? Ηοw can our thought intuit through its most finite limit, on the cusp of our Ego’s Death? Because it is true indeed that someone or something thinks behind our almighty Cogito, thinking there on a Hole. But what would this now here signify? A “Vacuum” –to say the least- “cogitans”? How can our thought per se think through its own unconceivable? It may be that on the contrary to Hamlet’s most famous monologue, there after all exists an instrument for the unknown. A death’s so called intuition. Preceding presence or absence, as a presupposition of their condition. Leading to the production of the “Thing in Itself” per se, opening, with the subject’s will, to our Thought’s ownmost Shadow, a consciously produced Unconscious, presupposition of every Limit, vindicating it as irreducible. Herein should now enter the era of our new philosophy. To a New Thought of the Absolute Limit. To a Thought of the Hole per se, as “Thing in Itself” throughout ourselves, but also, that is, on cost of them. Could this “Hole” now here signify another relation to the Ego, as subject or even as object, or of the Ego towards its object, beyond Sameness, that is, and Otherness, exceeding but containing both, in a radical Nearness/Farness, in a way till now unconceivable by psychoanalysis or poststructuralism? On the basis of which exact concept would this new Subject burst? Forming our new Loing-pres , a Farnearness, that is, per se, beyond “Clearing”, “Chiasm” or “Differe/a/nce, -all of the infinite paradigm- vindicating a fatally wounded Thought which bleeds on its fatal Limit? Revealing thus a New Epoch of the understanding of being per se? Exploding right there exactly? On the edge of this sharpest interval? Featuring as our new Cogito? Not seeing the “Other” latently as a complementary ex contrario “Object”, that is in its alterity, in its mutation or deconstruction, or after all its “jouissance”, complementary through its resistance , mutation or impossibility or even by its deconstruction , but being complemented fatally through its ownmost Massacre , its ownmost non completion? Could this be now a “Wound” ? A “Vulnus” to say the least, “Cogitans”, opening to a Death’s new ontology? Seeing being per se from the “other side of the mirror”, from the side, that is, of Death? Not seeing Death exoterically, in the last instance totally ignoring it, but bringing Death irreducibly inside the ontological game, without escaping him totally ex contrario? Via its resurrection? Because this is our only Hope against totalitarianism, in all its camouflaged faces. Against the capitalistic Paradigm in all its rich variations, which vindicates only Life per se, -phantasmatic, actual, virtual-, in its power’s non-stop becoming, and its always exorcising Death via dying non stop, incessantly, ignoring its Fatal Entropy. This is perhaps our only Hope against the fascism of the Multiple. Against the occurrence per se of Wars . Leading to a re-invention of our World again from scratch. Out Science. Our God. Our Art.

To a Cogito per se of Love .

Xρονικότητες

Χρόνος και ψυχοθεραπεία. Μία πρώτη προσέγγιση

Ένας χρόνος γραμμικός που έχει καθοριστεί σύμφωνα με ένα καθορισμένο αριθμητικό σύστημα. Μετράει. Κάθε δευτερόλεπτο του λεπτού, της ώρας, της μέρας. Μέχρι να γίνουν χρόνια. Ώστε να μπορεί κανείς να λέει ότι είναι 33 χρονών, 3 ωρών, 10 λεπτών και 30 δευτερολέπτων. 33 χρόνια από πότε; Από τότε που βγήκε από τον ενδομήτριο τόπο; Από το «ράπισμα του ψυχρού αέρα»; Από τη στιγμή της σύλληψης; Ή από τότε που γεννήθηκε μέσα στη σκέψη των γεννητόρων; Από τότε που άρχισε να κατοικεί τα ονειρά τους, τις φαντασιώσεις τους; Από τότε που άρχισαν να μιλάνε για αυτόν, μάλιστα βρίσκοντάς του, ήδη πολύ πριν γεννηθεί, την Μια λέξη, αυτή που θα τον ξεχωρίζει για πάντα, τη μεγαλύτερή του σφραγίδα, το Όνομά του; Ένα όνομα που δεν διάλεξε, αλλά θα φέρει ως στίγμα; To σημάδι του Κάιν μιας προπατορικής επιθυμίας; Aλλά και ακόμη πιο πίσω, από τότε που οι γονείς των γονιών του ονειρεύονταν (ή δεν), για ένα εγγόνι, έναν απόγονο, και φαντασίωναν ψηλαφίζοντας τη θέση του στον κόσμο και στην δική τους επιθυμία; Τα ίχνη της πραγματικής μας γέννησης χάνονται στον χρόνο. Έναν χρόνο που όπως αποδεικνύεται δεν λειτουργεί ως απλή αντίστροφη μέτρηση από μία στιγμή που απλώς ΄΄φαινόμαστε΄΄ στον κόσμο. Είναι ένας χρόνος δίνης, ένας χρόνος λογικός, καμπυλωμένος γύρω από ένα πρωταίτιο, το πρωταίτιο μας, το μεγάλο γιατί της επιθυμίας. Τί θέλησαν και μας ανείλκησαν από το τίποτα, από την ανυπαρξία στον κόσμο; Σε αυτόν τον μικρό, τον μέγα, με την πολύχρωμη βοή, τη μαρμαρυγή και τον ντόρο των πραγμάτων; Ποιά θέση έχουμε, πού χωράμε μέσα του, μέσα τους; Υπάρχουν στιγμές που όλη η προσωπική ιστορία περνάει σαν καλειδοσκόπιο από μπροστά μας. Μια ζωή που χωράει σε ένα κλάσμα. Μια αναγκαστική επιλογή στιγμών. Τί ίχνη χρόνου αφήνει πίσω της; Είναι ίδιος ο πραγματικός γραμμικός χρόνος με τον χρόνο που νιώθουμε ότι έχει περάσει από πάνω μας; Θυμόμαστε όλα τα γεγονότα σαν να έχουν διαρκέσει τον αριθμητικό τους χρόνο; Ή υποκειμενοποιείται αυτός ο χρόνος, κάνοντας άλλες στιγμές να φαίνονται σαν αιωνιότητες και άλλες σαν να μην έγιναν ποτέ; Μεταφέροντας μας, σαν μέσα από σκωληκότρυπα, όπως θα έλεγε ένας φυσικός, σε γεγονότα μεταγενέστερα, αφήνοντας ένα τεράστιο χάσμα στο ενδιάμεσο, ένα χωροχρονικό vacuum μιας ωπής, μιας μαύρης τρύπας; Θυμόμαστε, ανακαλούμε τα γεγονότα με τη χρονολογική τους πάντα σειρά; Ή έχουμε πολλές φορές την αίσθηση ότι κάποιο που ακολούθησε προϋπήρξε; Υπήρξε η αιτία ενός που προηγήθηκε; Πόσο χρονών εντέλει νιώθουμε; Υπάρχουν άραγε μεγαλύτερες αποδείξεις από αυτές για τα πολλά πρόσωπα του Χρόνου; Για αυτόν τον παλμικό, ακιδοειδή συστολικό-διαστολικό ιριδισμό; Πάντα κάτι μέσα στον Χρόνο μένει εκτός του, πάντα κάτι μας διαφεύγει, κάτι που δεν υπόκειται σε προκρούστειες γραμμικές λογικές. Τα πολλά πρόσωπα του Χρόνου είναι μόνο ένα μονοπάτι από τα πολλά που αποδεικνύουν την αλληλοσυμπλοκή των διαφορετικών μας πραγματικοτήτων. Γιατί ο νους, οι αισθήσεις, το σώμα, το πνεύμα πατάνε το καθένα και σε μια άλλη πραγματικότητα, αποτελούν το καθένα και μια άλλη ΄΄κατασκευή΄΄ του Έξω. Αποτελούν άλλες του εκφάνσεις. Άλλη είναι η χρονική ΄΄λογική΄΄ του καθενός. Με αυτή την έννοια η ψυχοθεραπεία γίνεται ένα ταξίδι στον Χρόνο, ένα ταξίδι που καμία επιστημονική φαντασία δε μπορεί να αντιγράψει. Ξεδιπλώνουμε το θέατρο της Ζωής μας, αλλάζοντας ελεύθερα οπτική γωνία, εστίαση, αφηγηματικά επίπεδα, προοπτική, διακτινιζόμενοι όχι μόνο από το μέλλον στο παρελθόν και αντίστροφα, αλλά ζώντας ταυτόχρονα και διαφορετικές του εκφάνσεις, και μάλιστα εκφάνσεις ενός μέλλοντος που δεν έχει ακόμη έρθει. Ή ζώντας εκ νέου, σαν να μην το είχαμε ζήσει ποτέ, ένα παρελθόν που ξεχάσαμε, ή αρνηθήκαμε, ή δεν προλάβαμε να γευτούμε. Με αυτή την έννοια είμαστε ΄΄έργα in progress΄΄, σε εξέλιξη, έργα που από τη μια διεκδικούν την τελείωσή τους και από την άλλη συνεχώς μεταθέτουν, αφήνοντας μετέωρη, σε εκκρεμότητα την τελευταία τους πράξη, διεκδικόντας έτσι τον χαμένο τους Χρόνο και διατηρώντας την πιο ενήλικη χαμένη τους παιδικότητα.